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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] The 2006 E-Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (2006 Amendments or the Amendments)1 do not directly
address the onset or scope of preservation obligations. As noted in the
September 2005 Report of the Standing Committee of the Judicial
Conference2 recommending adoption of the 2006 Amendments,

* © 2006 Thomas Y. Allman. Tom Allman is Senior Counsel to Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
Maw LLP (Chicago) and a member of the Steering Committee of the WG1 Working
Group of the Sedona Conference.® He co-chairs the Lawyers for Civil Justice Committee
on E-Discovery and is a frequent writer, commentator and speaker on topics relating to
corporate compliance and electronic discovery.
1
The 2006 Amendments with Committee Notes came into effect December 1, 2006. For
a complete text of the rules and notes, see
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf [Hereinafter Amendments].
The amendments impact Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45 and Form 35. For a summary of the
development of the new rules, see Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed
Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 13 (2006).
2
The Standing Committee is responsible for the rule-drafting activities of its Advisory
Committees on Appellate Rules, Bankruptcy Rules, Civil Rules and Evidence Rules. The
Civil Rules Advisory Committee completed its six year e-discovery rule drafting effort
with its Report of May 27, 2005, as revised July 25, 2005 (“Advisory Committee
Report”). A copy of that Report is reproduced as Appendix C to the Report of Judicial
Conference Of the United States on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Standing
Committee Report”), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf.
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preservation obligations “arise from independent sources of law” and are
dependent upon “the substantive law of each jurisdiction.”3 However, the
Amendments have a major impact on how parties must analyze and
execute preservation obligations involving electronically stored
information (“ESI”).4
[2] This article first discusses the contours of the obligation to preserve
and the relevant provisions of the 2006 Amendments. It then discusses the
legal and practical aspects of preserving active data as well as information
found on less accessible sources, such as backup media, dynamic
databases, individual hard drives and legacy sources.
[3] The article concludes with a summary of the elements of a typical
litigation hold process, as well as a discussion of the offensive use of
protective orders to determine preservation obligations.5 A “legal hold”6
or “litigation hold”7 is the method used to notify personnel in relevant
functional and business units about the necessity for preservation in a
specific case. It can be a hectic and demanding task.8 Its careful
Citations in this article to the pages of the Advisory Committee Report correspond to the
pagination adopted and used in the Appendix.
3
Id. at Rules pages 32-34.
4
While the focus of this article is on ESI, preservation obligations attach to all forms of
potentially discoverable evidence, including tangible objects and documents subject to
discovery under Rule 34(a) of the Amendments.
5
The author expresses gratitude to Craig Ball for his help in articulating some of the
more technical aspects of this article and to Deidre Paknad and Bobbi Basile for their
helpful comments and suggestions regarding litigation holds. Any shortcomings or errors
contained in this article, however, are solely those of the author.
6
The Sedona Conference® Working Group on Best Practices for Electronic Document
Retention & Production utilizes the phrase “legal hold” in its comprehensive description
of the process. See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES GUIDELINES &
COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE,
Guideline 5, Comment 5.e. (February 2005), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSG9_05.pdf (“Legal holds and
procedures should be appropriately tailored to the circumstances.”).
7
Courts have increasingly adopted the “litigation hold” terminology to describe this
process, as does this article. See, e.g., Consol. Alum. Corp. v. ALCOA, No. 03-1055-CM2, 2006 WL 2583308 (M.D. La. July 19, 2006).
8
See Michael E. Lackey, Jr., Litigation Holds: Practical Considerations, Electronic
Discovery and Retention Guidance for Corporate Counsel 2006, 747 PLI/Lit 279 (2006)
(describing the need for prompt action and suggesting that parties should err on the side
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implementation is particularly important in light of the paradigm shift
towards heightened judicial scrutiny9 of preservation decisions made by
producing parties.
A. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE
[4] A duty to maintain or safeguard potential evidence (to “preserve the
status quo” pending discovery) exists when a party learns of the
commencement of litigation or when litigation is “foreseeable” with a
degree of certainty.10 Similar obligations are incurred by parties who
decide to pursue a claim or institute a proceeding.11 Identifying the
moment in time when these obligations are “triggered” or “arise” involves
an exercise of informed judgment.12 Arrival of a preservation demand
from opposing counsel,13 for example, may be material to determining
whether or when an obligation to preserve arises. However, it is not
determinative of the actions which must be undertaken in response.14

of being over inclusive in light of the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure).
9
C.f. Wood v. Sempra Energy Trading Corporation, No. 3:03-CV-986 (JCH), 2005 WL
3465845 at *6 (“Taking the record before this court as a whole, . . . the court cannot find
that either that [sic] Sempra failed to do a thorough search for documents responsive to
Wood’s request, nor can it find that there are documents that exist which Sempra has
purposefully withheld.”).
10
See Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns, 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005) (stating that a
duty to preserve was triggered by conversations with a supervisor one year prior to filing
of EEOC complaint).
11
See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 495, 496-98 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(holding that destruction of patent files prior to filing of infringement claim constituted
spoliation of evidence).
12
See George Paul, The Significance of Litigation Holds in E-Discovery, COMPLIANCE
RESOURCES, Nov. 2006, available at
http://www.complianceresources.org/counsel/comply_archive/expert/200605.html
(determining when obligation is triggered is a matter of judgment based on a
sophisticated cost/benefit analysis despite simplistic case law on topic).
13
The widespread use of demand letters is a relatively recent phenomenon. Demand
letters are sometimes sent to gain tactical advantage. See Frey v. Gainey Transp. Servs.,
No. 1:05-CV-1493-JOF, 2006 WL 2443787 at *1-2, *25-26 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2006)
(involving nineteen-page demand letter was intended to “sandbag” producing party in the
event that all demands were not met).
14
See Turner v. Resort Condos. Int’l L.L.C., No. 1:03-cv-2025 DFH-WTL, 2006 WL
1990379, *8 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2006) (denying motion for sanctions where motion was
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[5] In general, a party is only under an obligation to make reasonable and
good faith efforts to preserve potentially discoverable information and
tangible things15 pending discovery.16
The duty applies both to
information within and outside17 the United States, which is under the
custody and control of the party,18 including potential evidence which may
be in databases created by third party vendors.19 The scope of the
obligation is not determined by the classification assigned to the
information for records management purposes.20
[6] A party may need to act affirmatively to prevent the destruction of
information. This intervention process is part of what is known as a
“litigation hold.”21 A widely accepted statement of this principle, arising
out of the Zubulake litigation,22 is that “[o]nce a party reasonably
based on mistaken belief that producing party was required to comply with overly broad
demand letter).
15
See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, Principle 5 at *23, (July 2005),
available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=7_05TSP.pdf (enter
requested information and click “download”) (stating that a party must act reasonably and
in good faith in executing preservation obligations, but is not expected to take every
conceivable step) [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPALS].
16
Miller v. Holzmann, CA No. 95-01231 (RCL/JMF), 2007 WL 172327, at *6 (D. D.C.
Jan. 17, 2007) (applying Sedona Principle 5 in the context of government reaction to a
FOIA request).
17
See Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTS/RLE, 2006
WL 3208579, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006) (granting motion to compel production from
computers located in government agencies in Spain).
18
See MacSteel, Inc. v. Eramet N. Am., No. 05-74566, 2006 WL 3334011, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 16, 2006) (finding no duty to preserve notes made by and in possession of
former employee).
19
Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04Civ.7406(WHP)(HBP), 2005 WL 3453908, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (involving databases maintained by outside vendor in
connection with previous litigation projects).
20
Wells v. Orange County School Board, Case No. 6:05-cv-479-Orl-28DAB, 2006
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 81265, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2006) (ruling that a record retention
policy allowing destruction of transitory e-mail was not determinative of preservation
obligations).
21
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at C-85 (explaining that when a party
is under a duty to preserve information because of pending or reasonably anticipated
litigation, intervention in the routine operation of an information system is one aspect of
what is often called a “litigation hold”).
22
In a series of opinions written in 2003 and 2004, Judge Shira Sheindlin of the Southern
District of New York famously dealt with e-mail-related preservation obligations in the
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anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document retention
policy/destruction policy and put in place a litigation hold to ensure
preservation” of relevant ESI.23 The exact responses will vary with the
type of litigation and an assessment of what is at stake.24
[7] A number of unique attributes make the execution of preservation
obligations particularly difficult when ESI is involved. First, information
may be available only for an “evanescent time period”25 and thus difficult
to preserve. Dynamic databases, for example, are often crucial to the
ongoing operation of an enterprise,26 but implementing a litigation hold in
such a context, absent an infrastructure established for that purpose, can be
very problematic.27 Second, routine business processes are often designed
to free up storage space for other uses without any intent to impede the
preservation of potential evidence for use in discovery.28 Interruption of
those routine processes is notoriously difficult to implement in a consistent
fashion. Moreover, since some types of ESI not ordinarily visible to a
context of a single plaintiff discrimination action against her former employer. See
generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake
V); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake II);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.NY. 2003) (Zubulake I).
23
See, e.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assoc., No. 05 C 3003, 2006 WL 1308629, at *8
(N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (citing Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218).
24
See Gregory G. Wrobel, Andrew W. Gardner & Michael J. Waters, Counsel Beware:
Preventing Spoliation of Electronic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation, 20 ANTITRUST 79,
80-81 (2006) (contrasting the preservation scope of a typical private antitrust case
involving market power and competitive harm under the Sherman Act with the relatively
narrow focus of a typical employment discrimination case).
25
O’Brien v. O’Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133, 1137 (5th Cir. 2005) (“We do not believe that
this evanescent time period [the length of time an image appears on a screen] is sufficient
to transform acquisition of the communications from a contemporaneous interception to
retrieval from electronic storage.”).
26
See MONICA GREENAN, WORKSHOP ON PRESERVATION OF DATABASES,
http://palimpsest.stanford.edu/byform/mailing-lists/cdl/2003/0099.html (last visited
March 19, 2007).
27
See Burkybile v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., No. 04 C 4932, 2006 WL 3191541, at *4
(N. D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2006) (outlining difficulties arising from the fact that “the database,
like some sort of digital organism, changes over time”).
28
See Turner v. Resort Condos. Int’l, L.L.C., No. 1:03-cv-2025-DFH-WTL, 2006 WL
1990379, at *6 (S.D. Ind. July 13, 2006) (stating that the preservation demands went well
beyond legal obligations and failed to accommodate the complex computer network).
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user (such as metadata or embedded data)29 may be ultimately necessary
in a case, attention must be paid to the risk of corrupting the data,
intentionally or not, in the preservation process.30
[8] Perhaps the greatest difficulty with preservation of electronic
information arises from the sheer volume and diversity of ESI. This fact is
crucial in the context of spoliation allegations, since it cannot be assumed
that a failure to preserve ESI is equivalent to intent to spoliate.31
B. SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES
[9] A failure to adequately execute preservation obligations can, in some
circumstances, result in sanctions,32 with penalties ranging from monetary
sanctions to adverse inference jury instructions and even to dismissal of
claims or defenses.33 A finding of culpability is typically central in
determining the sanctions applied.34 When a party intentionally fails to
29

See Craig Ball, Understanding Metadata: Knowing Metadata’s Different Forms and
Evidentiary Significance is Now an Essential Skill for Litigators, 13 L. TECH. PRODUCT
NEWS 36, 36 (2006) (distinguishing between application and system metadata on the
basis of where it is stored and emphasizing that some metadata is more relevant than
others and plays a variety of functions depending upon the case).
30
See In re Priceline.Com Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 88 (D. Conn. 2005). The court in
that opinion addressed the production and preservation requirements of a variety of forms
of electronically stored information in a pre-trial order. See id. at 90-92.
31
See Convolve v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 176 (S.D. NY 2004)
(ruling that only in cases of intentional failure to preserve is it fair to presume that the
evidence would be harmful to the spoliator); see also Martin H. Redish, Electronic
Discovery and the Discovery Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 621 (2001) (“[E]lectronic
evidence destruction if done routinely in the ordinary course of business, does not
automatically give rise to an inference of knowledge of specific documents’ destruction,
much less intent to destroy those documents for litigation-related reasons.”).
32
See Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that
destruction of potentially relevant evidence can occur along a “continuum of fault”
ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to intentionality with
corresponding variance in penalties).
33
Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
“some indication of an intent to destroy the evidence for the purpose of obstructing or
suppressing the truth” is required to issue an adverse inference sanction where
information is destroyed through the routine operation of a document retention policy).
34
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, Principle 14, (“Sanctions, including spoliation
findings, should only be considered by the court if, upon a showing of a clear duty to
preserve, the court finds that there was an intentional or reckless failure to preserve and
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meet its obligations, the courts have not hesitated to identify such conduct
as bad faith and apply severe spoliation sanctions.35 However, even
absent proof of a deliberate intent to interfere with the litigation process,
courts have sanctioned parties for lack of diligence in executing
preservation obligations.36 Because of the complexities involved and the
room for error, the sanction process can be abused.37
[10] Courts assessing the need to issue sanctions for a failure to preserve
often cite the inherent powers of a court to act, not just the authority
granted by the Federal Rules.38
[11] Preservation lapses can also constitute a violation of state39 or
federal40 criminal laws dealing with obstruction of justice where
governmental investigations are involved.41
produce relevant electronic data and that there is a reasonable probability that the loss of
the evidence has materially prejudiced the adverse party.”).
35
See In re Telxon Corp. v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, No. 5:98CV2876, 2004 WL
3192729 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2004). See also Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v.
Morgan Stanley, No. CA 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885 at *9-10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23,
2005).
36
See Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 04837 (HB), 2006 WL
1409413 (S.D. N.Y. May 23, 2006) (sanctioning party and counsel for failure to
adequately search former servers used by defendant).
37
Sheila Mackay & Karla Wehbe, Upcoming Changes to the Federal Rules and the
Impact on the Litigation Technology Profession, 747 PRACT. L. INST. 339, 358 (2006)
(“There are already examples of parties using electronic discovery to either force
settlements or avoid the case issues by making the opposing counsel jump through
electronic discovery hoops.”).
38
See In re Quintus Corp., 353 B.R. 77, 92, (D. Del. 2006) (stating that the inherent
power to oversee litigation provides authority to sanction for failure to produce
information destroyed after a party should have reasonably anticipated litigation).
39
See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 690.40 (Consol. 2006).
40
18 U.S.C.A. §1519 (West Supp. 2005). A prominent securities analyst, for example,
was indicted and tried on several occasions for his actions in endorsing an e-mail to
colleagues that they should “catch up on file cleanup” before leaving for the holidays.
The allegation was that he was then aware of the existence of grand jury and subpoenas
calling for the production of e-mail. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 166 (2nd
Cir. 2006).
41
See Diane E. Hill, Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Pre-emptive Document
Destruction Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1519, 1566 (2004) (discussing whether destruction of information
pursuant to a records retention policy can be a criminal act).
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II. THE 2006 AMENDMENTS
[12] The Standing Committee and its rule-drafting Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules were urged by many, including the author,42 to deal directly
with the ambiguities of preservation obligations in the ESI context. The
Advisory Committee actually gave consideration to amending Rule 26 or
adding a new Rule 34.1 (“Duty to Preserve”) to provide that parties need
not suspend the “operation in good faith” of “disaster recovery or other
[computer] systems” provided that one day’s full backup was retained.
The proposal also stated that information stored in an inaccessible form
did not have to be preserved unless a court ordered the party to do so.43
[13] Ultimately, the Committee concluded that because of Rules Enabling
Act concerns, it would be better to focus on process improvements while
providing targeted guidance for courts facing motions for sanctions
involving a limited class of losses due to preservation failures.44
A. EARLY DISCUSSIONS
[14] A key component of the 2006 Amendments is the requirement that
“preservation issues” and other ESI “disclosure and discovery” issues be
discussed at the Rule 26(f) “meet and confer” conference held before the
Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference.45 Under this widely supported
change,46 parties must prepare a “discovery plan” after the Rule 26(f)
42

See Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards for Electronic Discovery, 68
DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 209 (2001).
43
See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Conference on Electronic
Discovery, Feb. 20-21, 2004, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_Conf_Agenda_Materials.pdf (navigate to Proposed Rule 34.1).
44
See Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability: The Search for a Limited Safe Harbor in
Electronic Discovery, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 7 (2006).
45
Rule 26(f) provides that the parties must meet and confer “as soon as practicable” but
not less than 21 days before the scheduling conference to discuss preservation and other
issues involved in disclosure and discovery of ESI, such as form or forms of production,
search terms, the process for claiming privilege or work-product protection and the like.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
46
Mandatory discussion of preservation issues was enthusiastically endorsed as a
panacea by many who testified at the Public Hearings in early 2005. The Testimony and
filed Comments of almost 200 witnesses are indexed at, and accessible from, the U.S.
Courts Administrative Office website (“Comments”). See
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conference dealing with those elements on which agreement is reached.
The court will thereafter issue a Scheduling Order reflecting the plans for
the course of the litigation.47
[15] The obligation to be open and candid in discussions is reinforced by
the initial disclosure requirement under Rule 26(a)(1), the requirements of
which apply to both parties and are independent of disclosure obligations
associated with requests for production under Rule 34.48
[16] Rule 26(f) singles out for discussion possible agreement on the
anticipated form or forms of production.49 An early agreement on specific
file formats for production can significantly reduce later disputes, given
that the choice of format leads inevitably to discussions of the relevance
and necessity, if any, for preservation and production of metadata and
embedded data. For example, in In re: Celexa and Lexapro Products

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html. The Comments represent a valuable
snapshot of e-discovery concerns and practices as of 2005 and contain many insightful
observations.
47
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
48
Under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), a party must provide a description, by category or location, of
any ESI that the disclosing party may use to support its “claims or defenses.” This
“initial” disclosure is to be made separately from and is not limited by the identification
requirements of Rule 26(b)(2)(b) which are triggered by service of a request for
discovery under Rule 34. Some commentators appear to confuse the two processes. See
Rick Wolf, A Brave New World of E-Discovery Rule (Part II), Compliance Week Guide
to E-Discovery, January 2007, available at
http://lexakos.com/Upload/Brave%20New%20World%20II.pdf, (“Under [the rules], at
the outset of every case parties must exchange a copy (or description by category and
location) of all relevant ESI, as well as a description of “inaccessible” ESI a party will
not search or produce.”). The Advisory Committee did not intend to expand the initial
disclosure requirement as suggested. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at
C-23 (“The [initial disclosure] obligation does not force a premature search, but only
requires disclosure, either initially or by way of supplementation, of information that the
disclosing party has decided it may use to support its case.”).
49
This discussion should include the steps that will be taken in regard to preservation of
the integrity of any metadata, embedded data or related information pending discovery.
A failure to, for example, employ appropriate methods to make forensically sound copies
can be a problem. See Craig Ball, What to Do When a Copy is Not a Copy, LEGAL TECH.
(Oct. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/PubArticleFriendlyLT.jsp?id=1161680719761.
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Liability Litigation,50 an agreement was reached to produce ESI in formats
that were searchable and manageable (including native file format or as
single page TIFF images with ASCII Text) together, to the extent
applicable, as metadata fields, author, recipient, date and subject line.
[17] The parties should also discuss techniques to reduce volumes for
review,51 including the possible use of confidentiality agreements
governing waiver of privilege or work product protection.52
[18] Finally, requesting parties should be prepared to discuss, to the extent
feasible, the discovery requests they intend to make in the case. Both
parties53 should discuss preservation steps already undertaken and any
plans for intervention in business processes. The Committee Notes to
Rules 26(f) and Rule 37(f) admonish parties to pay “particular attention”
in their discussions “to [maintaining] the balance between the competing
needs to preserve relevant evidence and to continue routine operations
critical to ongoing activities.”54

50

In re: Celexa and Lexapro Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1736, 2006 WL 3497757 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 13, 2006).
51
A partial listing of possible topics includes: (1) the claims and defenses to be asserted
and the potential for additional parties; (2) any potential sources of “active” data; (3)
steps undertaken or contemplated pursuant to a “litigation hold” process; (4) intentions to
seek information beyond that available on active systems; (5) potential cost-shifting; (6)
identification, at least informally, of any potential sources either party may deem to be
“not reasonably accessible” under Rule 26(b)(2)(B); and (7) methods to reduce volumes
to be reviewed, such as search terms, scope and methods of de-duplication, etc.
52
Including “quick peek” or “clawback” agreements, whereby parties to the agreement
agree that the inadvertent production does not, as to themselves, waive the right to assert
a privilege. The 2006 Amendments also include a provision, not discussed herein, which
provides a similar optional procedure for claiming privilege after production. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
53
Even in “asymmetric” discovery cases, plaintiffs have preservation obligations. For
example, in Leon v. IDX Sys., 464 F.3d 951, 955-57, 961 (9th Cir. Sept. 2006), the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action brought by a terminated employee who had
deliberately deleted personal files from a company furnished laptop in such a manner that
it was impossible to recover their use for defensive purposes.
54
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at C-34 to C-35 (“The parties should
take account of these considerations in their discussions, with the goal of agreeing on
reasonable preservation steps.”).
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[19] Early experience with this “best practice” approach confirms its value
in encouraging voluntary resolution of key issues. However, the Advisory
Committee intended that courts should become actively involved when
parties are unable to reach an agreement, and either party may seek such
intervention.55
B. RESPONSIBILITIES OF COUNSEL
[20] The Amendments elevate the need for early preparation by counsel56
on technical and practical issues to a new level. Parties and their counsel
must be able to competently conduct meaningful discussions about ESI at
the Rule 26(f) conference.57 Failure to cooperate risks a waiver of the
ability to later claim prejudice or seek sanctions for missed
opportunities.58
[21] The Committee Note to Rule 26(f) suggests that counsel should
become “familiar” with a client’s information systems to the degree
necessary to permit discussion of the potential issues involved.59 Local
55

The Advisory Committee added language to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) after the Public Hearings
to clarify that “the responding party may wish to determine its search and potential
preservation obligations by moving for a protective order.” Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 2, at C-50.
56
Both inside and retained counsel have a role to play. A full-time lawyer employed by
an entity owes primary loyalties to its employer/client. Retained counsel, on the other
hand, is responsible to the court in which the case is pending while simultaneously owing
an independent duty of loyalty to the client. While communications involving
preservation among them are generally subject to the attorney-client privilege when
counsel are based in the United States, there may be differences in regard to in-house
counsel overseas. See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., No. 04 Civ.
5316 (RMB)(MHD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87096, at *55-58 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2006)
(discussing impact of French law on communications between counsel in the United
States and counsel located in France).
57
Counsel for requesting parties should prepare themselves for discussions by acquiring
sufficient technical fluency to clearly articulate the scope and purpose of requests for ESI,
including the desired form or forms of production, including any particularlized need for
metadata and embedded data.
58
See Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (endorsing use of
search terms selected by defendant notwithstanding failure of plaintiff to participate in
discussion).
59
A failure to acquire sufficient knowledge to engage in such discussions arguably
violates the ethical obligation to provide competent representation. See ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) (“[L]egal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
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District Rules60 and electronic discovery “guidelines”61 reinforce this
expectation and in some cases mandate a degree of preparation beyond
that implied by the Committee Note.62 A parallel responsibility arises
from the ethical obligation of competence owed by counsel to a client.63
Counsel must be prepared to accurately present information about ESI to
the court.64
[22] Some decisions imply that counsel owes an independent duty to a
court to actively supervise65 a party’s compliance with preservation
obligations.66 In Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Resources Corporation,67
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). C.f. Thompson v. Jiffy Lube
Int’l, No. 05-1203-WEB, 2006 WL 3388502, at *2, n2 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2006) (ruling
that failure to take action regarding an order relating to an e-mail system “raises serious
questions about counsel’s experience, knowledge of applicable law, and resources
available [to represent class].”).
60
See, e.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. LOC. R. 26.1; D. DEL.R. 16(4)(B); D.N.J. LOC. CIV. R.
26.1; D. WYO. LOC. R. 26.1.
61
See “Guidelines for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information,” District of
Kansas, ¶1, (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/guidelines/electronicdiscoveryguidelines.pdf.
62
Id. at ¶ 2 (requiring disclosure of “individuals with knowledge of their client’s
electronic systems” prior to the Conference). See Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc.,
238 F.R.D. 648, 655-656 (D. Kan. 2006) (summarizing the duties of counsel arising
under the District of Kansas Guidelines).
63
See Steven C. Bennett, The Ethics of Electronic Discovery, Vol. 17 No. 2 PRAC.
LITIGATOR 45, 48 (Mar. 2006) (emphasizing the obligation to provide “competent”
representation).
64
Compare Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley, No. CA 03-5045 AI,
2005 WL 674885 at *9-10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (revoking a pro hac vice
admission in response to inadequate and inaccurate statements about e-discovery) with
Clare v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc., 928 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (C.A. 4th Dist., May 24,
2006) (finding violation of due process rights in manner of revocation especially in light
of absence of misconduct of counsel in its role as “the messenger”).
65
The ABA Discovery Standards distinguish between the preservation obligations of a
party and the responsibilities of its counsel. See ABA CIV. DISCOVERY STANDARDS
(1999), as amended (Aug. 2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf
(limiting, in Standard 10, counsel responsibilities to those involving advice regarding
preservation and consequences of failures).
66
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Zubulake V”)
(“[C]ounsel [both employed counsel and outside counsel] [are] responsible for
coordinating her client’s discovery efforts. In this case, counsel failed to properly oversee
UBS in a number of important ways, both in terms of its duty to locate relevant
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a court sanctioned a party and its law firm for failure to conduct a
“methodical survey of [Defendants] sources of information” in the manner
said to be required by the 2006 Amendments.68
[23] Conversations about preservation obligations are not necessarily
privileged when criminal grand jury investigations involving potential
criminal obstruction of justice are involved.69 Counsel cannot knowingly
aid in any attempt to avoid preservation obligations70 by the client, which
has the ultimate responsibility to preserve information for discovery.71
C. THE ACCESSIBILITY DILEMMA
[24] Discovery of ESI is governed by the two-tiered production obligation
under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) of the 2006 Amendments.72 Although requested
information and its duty to preserve and timely produce that information.”) (citing
Metropolitan Opera Assoc., v. Local 100, 212 F.R.D. 178, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). See
also Gregory G. Wrobel, Andrew M. Gardner & Michael J. Waters, Counsel Beware:
Preventing Spoliation of Electronic Evidence in Antitrust Litigation, 20 ANTITRUST 79,
80 (2006) (“[Other cases] do not address in the same depth the separate duty – if any – of
counsel to locate and preserve relevant electronic information.”).
67
Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp. , No. 05 Civ. 4837(HB), 2006 WL 1409413
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006).
68
Id. at *6. (“The duty in such cases is . . . to ascertain whether any information is stored
there.”). The District Judge held that the Amendments had “essentially” codified the
teaching of Zubulake IV & V of which outside counsel should have been well aware. Id.
In a subsequent opinion issued after dismissal of the case on the merits, the Court ordered
payment of attorneys’ fees associated with making the motion as a sanction. See Phoenix
Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837(HB), 2006 WL 2135798, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006) (approving monetary sanction).
69
See In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 269 (3rd Cir. 2006) (holding
contents of discussions are not privileged when the client may be committing crime of
obstruction of justice by participating in a scheme to delete e-mails after receiving
information from counsel about scope of pending subpoena).
70
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not: unlawfully
obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”).
71
See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 436 (“At the end of the day, however, the duty to
preserve and produce documents rests on the party [which after instructions from
counsel] is on notice of its obligations and acts at its own peril.”).
72
As discussed below, information located on sources which are not reasonably
accessible due to undue burden or costs are subject to production limitations. See FED. R.
CIV. PRO. 26(b)(2)(B).

13

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 3

to do so,73 the Advisory Committee did not adopt mandatory cost-shifting
as a means to deter unnecessary requests for production from inaccessible
sources. Instead, the Advisory Committee adopted Rule 26(b)(2)(B)74 to
provide a presumptive – but refutable – limitation on initial production
from those sources which a producing party affirmatively identifies as
“not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”75 The Rule
places the burden of defending the classification on the producing party76
and allows for production from an inaccessible source for “good cause.”77
The Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) states that “[i]n many
circumstances the requesting party should obtain and evaluate the
information from such sources before insisting that the responding party
search and produce information contained on sources that are not
reasonably accessible.” The Committee Note also emphasizes that the
73

For example, at a public hearing of the Advisory Committee, Greg Lederer of the
IADC argued in favor of mandatory cost-shifting for discovery of ESI. See Greg
Lederer, President-Elect of the IADC, Testimony at Public Hearing on Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 102-107 (Jan. 28, 2005), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/DallasHearing12805.pdf.
74
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) provides, in its entirety:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or
for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must
show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may
nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party
shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
The court may specify conditions for the discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(B).
75
Examples of sources which are not reasonably accessible “from current technology”
cited by the Advisory Committee include backup tapes intended for disaster recovery
purposes, legacy data from obsolete systems, deleted data which remains in fragmentary
form and databases that cannot readily create different forms of information than those
for which they were designed.
76
See Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Paul Liberman., No. 4:06 CV524-DJS, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 93380 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (showing that the burden of demonstrating
that the information is not reasonably accessible is satisfied by proof of the efforts
involved in copying a hard drive, recovering deleted information and translating
recovered data in searchable and reviewable format).
77
Id. at *15 (“good cause” to obtain mirror images demonstrated because of allegations
that the computer hard drives were used to secrete and distribute plaintiff’s confidential
information).
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proportionality principle in renumbered Rule 26(b)(2)(C)78 is available to
limit production where necessary.79
[25] The presumptive limitation on production creates a major dilemma
for a party seeking to decide if affirmative actions regarding a particular
inaccessible source are needed. Not until after a court rules on the need to
search and produce from the source, can or will, a party know if its initial
preservation decisions were correct.
[26] Accordingly, absent agreement with opposing counsel, unilateral
preservation decisions about inaccessible sources always carry some risk
of post-production challenge for potential spoliation. However, just as the
duty to produce is tempered by the principle of proportionality, so should
courts take the same approach in regard to preservation decisions.80
D. PRODUCTION FORMATS
[27] Rule 34 provides for discovery and production of all types of
electronically stored information – whether visible content, embedded data
or metadata81 – but the Rule does not regulate the extent, if any, that
78

See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2006) (noting that the
“concept of proportionality” was added in 1983 to promote judicial limitation on a caseby-case basis to avoid abuse by reducing burden and “overuse, whether intentional or
thoughtless, of broad discovery.”). The 2006 Amendments renumbered Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)
as Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and emphasized that production from all sources of ESI are subject to
its terms. See Amendments, supra note 1, at 7-8.
79
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (COMM. NOTE) (“The [proportionality] limitations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of electronically stored information,
including that stored on reasonably accessible electronic sources.”).
80
The ultimate protection for a party whose “guess” turns out to be wrong is that the
decisions were reasonable, made in good faith, and not intended to obstruct or prevent the
discovery of relevant information. See Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability: The
Search for a Limited Safe Harbor in Electronic Discovery, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 7
(2006).
81
For purposes of this article, I adopt the distinction between metadata and embedded
data used by the Advisory Committee. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (COMM. NOTE):
For example, production may be sought of information automatically
included in electronic files but not apparent to the creator or to readers.
Computer programs may retain draft language, editorial comments, and
other deleted matter (sometimes referred to as “embedded data” or
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metadata and embedded data must be produced in any particular case.82
The focus in Rule 34 is on the form or forms of production of the ESI
sought in discovery.83 While this necessarily implicates issues about
metadata and embedded data, it is not synonymous with it.
[28] Electronically stored information is created and stored in a “native”
file format which uniquely reflects the software application operating in
conjunction with the computers file system. This “native” format contains
information apparent to the user, but also may carry embedded data and
metadata accessible only to the application that created it. While some
information (e.g., file name, size and date information) is routinely
furnished in discovery, other metadata and embedded data is rarely
relevant and presents significant functional and practical drawbacks when
produced as part of a native file format.84 The production of metadata and
embedded data raises ethical and practical issues which may complicate
privilege review.85

“embedded edits”) in an electronic file but not make them apparent to
the reader.
Information describing the history, tracking, or
management of an electronic file (sometimes called ‘metadata’) is
usually not apparent to the reader viewing a hard copy or a screen
image.
82
See Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 649 (D. Kan. Sept. 29,
2005) (“Although Rule 34(b) uses the phrase ‘in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily
maintained,’ [the Rule and Comments] provide no further guidance as to whether a
party’s production . . . would encompass the electronic document’s metadata.”).
83
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(ii):
[Unless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise orders:] . . .
if a request does not specify the form or forms for producing
electronically stored information, a responding party must produce the
information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in
a form or forms that are reasonably usable.
84
Individual pages from documents produced in native file formats are difficult or
impossible to redact or Bates number and are more difficult to use in depositions or at
trial than imaged formats. A privilege review can also be more difficult to accomplish in
a timely and cost effective manner.
85
See ABA Formal Opinion 06-442 (Review and Use of Metadata) (advocating
scrubbing of metadata to avoid disclosures). But compare the Maryland and New York
ethics opinions summarized in, John F. Baughman and H. Christopher Boehning,
Metadata Ethics Electronic Discovery, 236 N.Y. L J. 5, Col. 1 (Dec. 26, 2006).
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[29] Rule 34(b) outlines a procedure for reaching agreement on the form
or forms of production of ESI. As a matter of best practice, and pursuant
to the intent of Rule 26(f), the issues should be discussed promptly at the
initial early meet and confer. In Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. National
Association of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc.,86 the court stressed the role of
Rule 26(f) under the 2006 Amendments in refusing a belated attempt to
seek metadata. A party seeking production of metadata or embedded data
should therefore identify its interest in its production promptly so as to
allow the producing party to attempt to accommodate the request or raise
an appropriate objection, as is implicitly provided in Rule 34(b).87 An
early and practical agreement is the preferred outcome,88 and failure to
discuss the issue or make a specific request waives objection to production
without the specific metadata or embedded data.89 Typically, where the
issue is contested in a timely fashion, courts require a showing of
particularized need90 or relevance91 before ordering production of
metadata and embedded data.92
86

Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., No. 05-138WOB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92028, at *23 (Dec. 18, 2006) (“[T]he issue of whether
metadata is relevant or should be produced is one which ordinarily should be addressed
by the parties in a Rule 26(f) conference.”).
87
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (“If objection is made to the requested form or forms for
producing electronically stored information – or , if no form was specified in the request
– the responding party must state the form or forms it intends to use.”).
88
See In re Celexa and Lexapro Prod. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1736, 2006 WL 3497757, at
*3 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2006) (involving a comprehensive agreement to produce ESI in
“any format that generally is searchable and manageable (including native file format or
as single page TIFF images with ASCII Text . . . and the following, to the extent
applicable, as metadata: author, recipient, date, subject line).”).
89
Kentucky Speedway, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92028, at *21-23 (ruling that Rule 34(b)
does not require production of metadata absent a showing of a particularized need and
failure to raise issue prior to production waives objection).
90
See Wyeth v. Impax Lab., No. Civ. A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del.
Oct. 26, 2006) (ruling that production in native format was not required in the absence of
foreseeable or necessary requirement for accessing metadata); accord, SEDONA
PRINCIPLES , supra note 34, at Principle 12 (“Unless it is material to resolving the
dispute, there is no obligation to preserve and produce metadata absent agreement of the
parties or order of the court.”).
91
See Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali S.R.L., No. 04 C 3109, 2006 WL
665005, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006) (metadata ordered produced because relevant to
establishing chronology of case).
92
Some decisions requiring production in native format do not explain the basis for their
ruling. See Nova Measuring Instruments Ltd. v. Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F. Supp.2d 1121,
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[30] Under amended Rule 34(b), if a party has not requested a particular
form or forms of production and no agreement or a court order exists, a
producing party has the option to produce either in the form or forms “in
which [ESI] is ordinarily maintained” or in a “reasonably useful” format.
The reference to the form in which it is maintained appears to encompass
production in some variation of native file format with appropriate
metadata and embedded data determined by the type of ESI involved.93
The “reasonably useable” option allows for production in other formats,94
provided that any metadata or embedded data necessary to make the
format comparably useful to the way it is available to the producing party,
especially in regard to search capabilities, is also furnished.95
[31] The need for metadata and embedded data varies depending upon the
type of ESI involved and the issues in the case. In actual practice, the
topic is negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Parties frequently agree to
produce e-mail in convenient and difficult to alter forms that faithfully
preserve the appearance of the content so that the images of individual
1122 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2006) (ordering production in native format because producing
party “offers no reason why” the order should not issue); accord In re Verisign, Inc. Sec.
Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at *3 (Mar. 10, 2004) (upholding prior
order of magistrate judge as not clearly erroneous because redaction and bates numbering
difficulties do not “transcend all reasonableness.”). It was possible to read the former
Rule 34 as requiring production of “identical” copies, including information not
ordinarily visible to a viewer. See Hagenbuch, 2006 WL 6605005 at *3. Amended Rule
34(b) clarifies that this is only one of several options available to a producing party in the
absence of a request and an agreement or court order to that effect.
93
See Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12
RICH. J. L. & TECH. 13 at *21, n. 72 (2006) (noting the observation by some Advisory
Committee members that to “technically adept lawyers and experts” the reference could
include metadata and embedded data).
94
See Production – Form of Production, EDRM Project, available at
http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Production_-_Form_of_Production (differentiating
between production in Paper, Quasi-Paper, Quasi-Native and Native).
95
See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 34(b) (COMM. NOTE).
But [this option] does not mean that a responding party is free to
convert electronically stored information from the form in which it is
ordinarily maintained to a different form that makes it more difficult or
burdensome for the requesting party to use the information efficiently
in the litigation.
If the responding party ordinarily maintains the
information it is producing in a way that makes it searchable by
electronic means, the information should not be produced in a form that
removes or significantly degrades this feature. Id.
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pages can be Bates numbered and readily used in depositions and at trial.96
Such page image production formats, principally the Tagged Image File
Format (“TIFF”) and Adobe Portable Document Format (“PDF”) are
typically accompanied by “load files,” i.e., ancillary files containing
textual content and relevant metadata. In other cases, such as production
of spreadsheets, sound recordings, animated content, web pages, video and
drawings (which do not lend themselves to production in imaged form) or
large databases, production is often best accomplished in “native” or
“quasi-native” file formats because of the complexity involved.97
[32] In any event, absent an agreement to the contrary, it is advisable to
preserve sources of ESI covered by a litigation hold in their native file
formats if there is any possibility that metadata or embedded data relating
to that ESI may be deemed material. This preserves the ability to prepare
an appropriate extract of any metadata which may be required or to make
production in some variant of a native file format or in native file format.
In the leading case of In re Priceline.Com Inc., Securities Litigation,98 the
court ordered production in “TIFF” and “PDF form but required the
original data be maintained in its original native file format for the
duration of the litigation. Indeed, a failure to maintain ESI in native
format pending production arguably constitutes spoliation by a party on
notice of its possible use, since discoverable metadata and embedded data
are no different than other forms of ESI.99
E. THE LIMITED “SAFE HARBOR”
[33] In response to advocacy for a bright-line “safe harbor” for parties that
act reasonably in discharging preservation obligations,100 Rule 37(f)
96

See Ponca Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. Cont’l Carbon Co., No. CIV -05-445-C, 2006
WL 2927878, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 11, 2006) (approving production of the
“equivalent of pictures of the e-mails” and denying request for production in “their native
electronic format.”).
97
Production, supra note 94.
98
In re Priceline.Com Inc., Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 88, 91 (D. Conn. 2005).
99
See, In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:98CV2876, 1:01CV1078, 2004 WL 3192729
passim (N.D. Ohio 2004) (noting concern over explanations for changes in metadata).
100
See, e.g., Proposals to Reform the Fed. Rules Regarding E-Discovery: Public Hearing
on Proposed Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure Before the Comm. on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the United States (Feb. 11,
2005) (statement of Lawrence La Sala, Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) (04-CV-
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tempers the sanctions which may be assessed after certain routine losses of
ESI.101 If a party has acted in “good faith” in executing its preservation
obligations, no rule-based sanctions are to be imposed,102 even if that loss
involved a failure to preserve under the applicable substantive law, unless
it occurs under “exceptional circumstances.”103 The Advisory Committee
noted that “good faith” conduct is measured by the reasonableness of
actions undertaken regarding preservation,104 and a loss is protected even
when it involves human actions in carrying out the routine operations.105
Exclusion from the “safe harbor” 106 requires a showing of more than mere
negligence, although proof of reckless or willfulness is not required.107
[34] Rule 37(f) reflects the fact that in the world of electronic information,
it is simply not fair to assume that a loss of ESI necessarily equates to
intent to destroy evidence.108 As explained by Turner v. Resort
095)) (threat of sanctions has delayed implementation of legitimate corporate policies)
(04-CV-095) at 361, 370, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html.
101
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system.”).
102
See Robert R. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 201 (1968) (stating
that use of “good faith” operates to exclude actions undertaken in bad faith). See
generally Robert R. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (summarizing the meaning of “good
faith” in a variety of contexts).
103
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f). Rule 37(f) is also inapplicable to adjustments in the quantity
of depositions or other discovery which may be required by the loss of relevant
responsive information to discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P 37(f) (COMM. NOTE).
104
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at C-86 (suggesting that good faith
under Rule 37(f) is “measured by [the] efforts to arrange for the preservation of
information on [a] system.”).
105
The Advisory Committee cited “recycle[ing] storage media kept for brief periods
against the possibility of a disaster that broadly affects computer operations” as one
example of a routine operation which might be covered. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (COMM.
NOTES) .
106
Others refer to it as a “guidepost” or “beacon.”
107
See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at C-83. Rule 37(f) should be seen as
limiting the impact of Residential v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107-108 (2d Cir.
2002) (authorizing sanctions in the Second Circuit for merely negligent conduct).
108
See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL Docket No. 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *6
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2007). Case Management Order No. 2 provides that the failure to
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Condominiums International LLC, Rule 37(f) constitutes a policy decision
which “recognizes that discovery should not prevent continued routine
operation of computer systems.” 109 Not all commentators are enthusiastic
about the Rule and it remains to be seen exactly how courts will apply
it.110
[35] Rule 37(f) may have only limited impact on courts relying upon their
inherent power since the Rule expressly relates only to rule-based
sanctions.111 However, a more likely result is that Rule 37(f) will come to
serve, as it did in Convolve Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corporation,112 as
persuasive guidance when the factual pattern is one which would be
impacted if the court were proceeding under the Federal Rules.113 When
complex information systems are involved, something almost always
“slip[s] through” the implementation of even the most reasonable and
comprehensive of preservation efforts.114

preserve every potentially relevant document, data or tangible thing “shall not in and of
itself mean that said party has engaged in spoliation of evidence.” Id.
109
Turner v. Resort Condos. Int’l LLC, 2006 WL 1990379, at *6, n.2 (S.D. Ind. July 13,
2006) (refusing to issue sanctions for alleged failures in preservation where there was no
bad faith alteration or destruction of evidence).
110
Academic commentators in particular find Rule 37(f) to be troubling. See, e.g. Maria
Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic
Information, 58 S.C.L. REV. 7, *54 (2006) (“[B]y requiring stringent standards of
culpability and clear showings of relevance and prejudice, the threat of sanctions
becomes a paper tiger.”). See generally Thomas Y. Allman, Rule 37(f) Meets Its Critics:
The Justification for a Limited Safe Harbor for ESI, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1
(2006) (reviewing and rebutting the criticisms and dire predictions about Rule 37(f)).
111
See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, 2006 WL
3050864, at *12, n4 (N.D. Calif. Oct. 25, 2006) (“[S]anctions imposed pursuant to a
court’s inherent powers [are] governed by a different set of principles than sanctions
under Rule 37.”).
112
Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
113
Rule 37(f) reflects a collective judgment by the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the Supreme Court and Congress that protection from sanctions should
predominate over other considerations in the limited area of losses from routine
operations of information systems.
114
MINUTES OF CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING 18 at 755 (Apr. 15-16,
2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/ rules/Minutes/CRAC0404.pdf., (noting that,
“[r]easonable steps do not always preserve everything. Things slip through. That is the
point of the safe harbor.”).
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III. IMPLEMENTING PRESERVATION OBLIGATIONS
[36] The execution of preservation obligations can involve the collection,
storage and preservation of massive amounts of ESI.115 Effective
implementation requires an inter-disciplinary team approach, led by legal
counsel and supported by Information Technology and, in some instances,
Records Management or other relevant functional or business units of the
entity. Where applicable, outside counsel and third-party service
providers may also play a role. The issue is how to best manage this
process in a reasonable manner while maintaining a sense of proportion in
the case.
A. PRESERVATION MECHANICS
[37] The steps needed to effectuate preservation vary with the types of
data involved and the characteristics of the sources on which it is stored.
1. GENERALLY
[38] The principal types of discoverable ESI are “active data” which do
not require any restoration (such as e-mail applications, database programs
or word processing applications) and “archival” data (such as that
transferred to peripheral media such as CDs, tapes, disks, or network
servers or the internet) which may require some effort to access.116
115

See Law.com, Legal Technology: E-Discovery Roadmap,
http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/eDiscoveryRoadmap.jsp (last visited March 19,
2007). A vivid graphic used by some commentators portrays “preservation” as the large
opening at the front end of a funnel leading to a smaller opening at the opposite end with
production of discoverable information after “culling” for relevancy and privilege. To
paraphrase the common wisdom, “the obligation to preserve is more extensive than the
obligation to produce.”
116
Whitney Adams and Jeffery Jacobs, Ghost in the Machine: Legal Developments and
Practical Advice in an Age of Electronic Discovery, 22 NO. 7 ACC Docket 48, at *70
(2004) (“[Active Data] is [c]urrent files on the computer that can be displayed without
using a restoration process. Active data are visible in directories and can be viewed in
plain text files or with a computer program, such as small applications, database
programs, or word processing applications. Active data [also] includes system data in a
recycle bin, history files, temporary internet directory and other data caches.”). Adams
and Jacobs differentiate “active” data from “archival” data, which they define as
information which requires restoration. Id., at *70 (discussing data which has been

22

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 3

Potentially discoverable information of this nature can best be preserved
by implementation of an appropriate “litigation hold” tailored to the
specifics of the case. However, in doing so, serious consideration must be
given to any automatic features which may delete or overwrite active data,
including any policies or processes which involve destruction of hard copy
documents or other things subject to the litigation hold.
[39] Many useful suggestions for implementing litigation holds are
available in the literature authored by experienced practitioners.117 A
common thread to these suggestions is diligence in locating and taking
affirmative action.118 Data can be left in place for management by
custodians subject to the litigation hold or it can be immediately collected
according to appropriate parameters. Export or collection is usually done
in native file formats to preserve the ability to access any of the metadata
and embedded data, an end easily frustrated by use of inappropriate
duplication methods. Creating a mirror image of the data is typically not
required absent an agreement or court order or some reason to suspect
potential alteration or deliberate actions to destroy evidence.
2. BACKUP MEDIA
[40] Most e-mail systems are “backed up” by periodic creation of a
duplicate copy (“snapshot”) of active information at a fixed point in time
transferred to peripheral media such as CDs, tapes, disks, or network servers or the
internet). Preservation obligations and the scope of litigation holds apply to both types of
information and appropriate consideration must be given to both in the planning process.
117
“The safest practice is to preserve the current or ‘active’ inbox, outbox, deleted items,
and other e[-]mail folders of the key players involved in the potential litigation, as well as
other electronic documents stored on such individuals’ local computers or shared file
servers.” Ashley Watson, Deidre Paknad, Mark A. McCarty and Leigh R. Rhoads,
Successful Corporate Strategies for Preservation Post Zubulake and Morgan Stanley, at
*3 (2005), available at
http://www.pss-systems.com/resources/PreservationStrategies.pdf.
118
See, e.g., the method approach advocated in Stephen M. Cutler, Laurie M. Stegman &
Paul M. Helms, Document Preservation and Production in Connection with Securities
and Exchange Commission Investigations and Enforcement Actions, 1517 PRAC. LAW
INST. 579, 593-594 (2005) (“[I]t is probably advisable to . . . retain documents and
backup tapes for relevant personnel, to catalog documents later created by these
personnel in a separate electronic file, and to create a mirror-image of the computer
system at the time the duty to preserve attaches.”).
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in order to allow for recovery of the information in the event of loss of
functionality or other disasters.119 Backups are usually recorded on
magnetic tapes, which are sometimes sought in discovery because they
can hold discoverable information deleted from active sources.
[41] A difficult issue is determining what steps, if any,120 to take with
regard to existing copies of backup media scheduled for recycling.
Withdrawing backup tapes from routine rotation in anticipation of possible
production can be expensive and disruptive.121 Production from such
sources can be accomplished, however, only if the backup media are
preserved. The Committee Note to Rule 37(f) suggests that a key factor in
deciding whether that should happen is whether a party believes the
information to be discoverable and not available on other more accessible
sources.122
[42] The cases are far from uniform on the need to routinely interrupt the
recycling of existing backup media.123 The Sedona Principles caution
119

See generally Eric Friedberg, To Recycle or Not to Recycle, That is the Hot Backup
Tape Question, 201 PLI/CRIM 205, 211-212 (2006).
120
See Standing Committee Note, supra note 2, at Rules 33 (“There is considerable
uncertainty as to whether a party must, at risk of severe sanctions, interrupt the operation
of the electronic information systems it is using to avoid any loss of information because
of the possibility that the information might be sought in discovery.”). The Advisory
Committee Report identified the recycling of backup as a “routine” operation of an
information system which, if conducted in good faith, should be exempt from rule-based
sanctions by virtue of Rule 37(f). See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at
Rules App. C-83.
121
Large organizations often recycle hundreds of backup tapes every two or three weeks
and placing a litigation hold on recycling can result in large expenses if the holds are
maintained even for a short period of time. The Advisory Committee Report described
backup media as an example of an inaccessible source because it is “often not indexed,
organized, or susceptible to electronic searching.” See Advisory Committee Report,
supra note 2 at Rules App. C-42.
122
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (COMM. NOTE) (“One factor [as to whether a party should
take steps to prevent overwriting] is whether the party reasonably believes that the
information on such sources is likely to be discoverable and not available from
reasonably accessible sources.”).
123
See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759
at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (“[T]o hold that a corporation is under a duty to preserve
all e-mail potentially relevant to any future litigation would be tantamount to holding that
the corporation must preserve all e-mail.”). But compare the case of Zubulake IV, where
the Court noted that “if a company can identify where particular employee documents are
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against reliance on backup media for production purposes,124 and
Comment 5h to Sedona Principle 5125 states that preservation obligations
do not extend to backup media “absent special circumstances.”126
Nonetheless, the reported sanctions from failures to preserve backup
media give pause. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that blanket
suspensions of recycling of existing media are often recommended by
outside counsel,127 thus creating even more problems for the future. The
remedy suggested by the Advisory Committee in the 2006 Amendments is
that parties reach an early and practical agreement128 on how backup
media should be handled.129
[43] The challenge is to achieve practical compromises which minimize
burdens and costs without incurring undue risks of spoliation. One
approach is to retain only the most recently created full backup along with
stored on back-up tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of ‘key players’ to the
existing or threatened litigation should be preserved if the information contained on those
tapes is not otherwise available.” Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
124
See SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at Principle 8 (“Resort[ing] to disaster
recovery backup tapes and other sources of data and documents requires the requesting
party to demonstrate need and relevance that outweigh the cost, burden, and disruption of
retrieving and processing the data from such sources.”).
125
See SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 15, at Principle 5 (“The obligation to preserve
electronic data and documents requires reasonable and good faith efforts to retain
information that may be relevant to pending or threatened litigation. However, it is
unreasonable to expect parties to take every conceivable step to preserve all potentially
relevant data.”).
126
The Sedona commentary rests on the assumption that few or little unique evidence
will be found and recommends use of sampling techniques to ascertain the accuracy of
that statement if in dispute.
127
See Friedberg, supra note 119, at 223 (emphasizing the complexities of applying
different preservation requirements to different data sets in the face of multiple holds).
128
Absent such an agreement, a potential producing party may have little choice but to
suspend a broad spectrum of backup media. In Zubulake IV, the court concluded that it
was at least negligent conduct to fail to preserve “potentially relevant backup tapes” once
a preservation obligation attached and that in “at least this Court,” any “backup tapes that
can be identified as storing information created by or for ‘key players’ must be
preserved.” Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 n.47 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
129
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (COMM NOTE) (“Whether a responding party is
required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially responsive information that it
believes are not reasonably accessible depends on the circumstances of each case. It is
often useful for the parties to discuss this issue early in discovery.”).
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selected copies from relevant time frames.. In the case of In re Celexa and
Lexapro Products Liability Litigation, the producing party created a set of
backup tapes at the outset of litigation and set them aside for purposes of
future discussion. After negotiations, the parties entered into an agreed
order that provided that the defendant would preserve those backup tapes
but would otherwise resume recycling. 130 Disruption of existing backup
tape rotation routines may not be required where the underlying dispute is
strictly historic or where communications are not likely to be decisive.131
As a leading commentator has noted, “[c]ounsel should be especially wary
of requiring the client to suspend backup tape rotation where the litigation
is far removed in time from the underlying events.”132
[44] In contrast, the necessity of halting the recycling of future backup
media after they are created can be avoided by instituting effective
alternative methods of preserving information that is subject to deletion,
coupled with aggressive monitoring of the process.133
[45] Preferably, any disagreements over recycling should be resolved by
consultation. When this is not possible,134 a producing party which
establishes a litigation hold in a reasonable manner135 and in good faith, 136

130

In re: Celexa and Lexapro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1736, 2006 WL 3497757, at
*2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 13, 2006).
131
Antitrust actions relating to past events are typical of this genre. See Concord Boat
Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759 at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
29, 1997) (“[T]o hold that a corporation is under a duty to preserve all e-mail potentially
relevant to any future litigation would be tantamount to holding that the corporation must
preserve all e-mail.”).
132
Friedberg, supra note 119, at 214.
133
Individual custodians can be asked to drag and drop copies of relevant e-mails they
send to a secure networked location.
134
Preservation decisions on backup media may have to be made before an opposing
counsel is involved or litigation has commenced. It is also conceivable that it may be
impractical or unduly expensive to seek immediate court relief, which may not be
available due to caseload or other considerations.
135
See Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison,13 Misc.3d 604 (N.Y. Sup. Aug. 17, 2006)
(managing production taking into account that interim backup tapes largely contained
duplicative material). The Court in Delta Financial used a limited sample search
approach coupled with limited cost shifting to determine if a full search was needed of
those backup tapes whose contents were available. See generally id.
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should be deemed to have satisfied its preservation obligations, as is
implicit in Rule 37(f). However, where the risks of non-production are
deemed to be unacceptable, a party may have little choice but to
temporarily suspend rotation and seek an immediate court order for a
protective order testing the adequacy of the steps undertaken.
3. DYNAMIC INFORMATION
[46] When information is constantly overwritten, preservation obligations
can be difficult or impossible to execute.137 One cannot preserve what
does not exist.138 Information on relational databases is often stored in a
manner which does not permit ease of access in any manner other than a
programmed inquiry.139 The Advisory Committee noted that “many
database programs automatically create, discard, or update information”
and “that suspending or interrupting these features can be prohibitively
expensive and burdensome.”140
136

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (COMM. NOTE) (“Whether good faith would call for steps to
prevent the loss of information on sources that the party believes are not reasonably
accessible under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) depends on the circumstances of each case.”).
137
A similar problem can exist with some forms of instantaneous communications, such
as chat rooms, IM, etc. where no provisions for preservation exist. See, e.g., Malletier v.
Dooney & Bourke, Inc, No. 04 Civ.5316 RMB MHD, 2006 WL 3851151, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (no duty to preserve chat room comments prior to installation of
software permitting it).
138
The focus of Rule 34(a) is on electronically stored information. Many databases
continuously add new data to their tables rather than overwrite it and contain enormous
volumes of data points that are typically assembled into meaningful sets based on specific
queries or functions conducted by users.
139
The Advisory Committee cited the “distinctive” features of databases as one of the
justifications for the Rule 37(f) limitation on sanctions for pre-discovery failures to
preserve (“[M]any database programs automatically create, discard, or update
information without specific direction from, or awareness of, users [and] are essential to
the operation of electronic information systems.”). Advisory Committee Report, supra
note 2, at C-83. The Committee cited databases as examples from “current” technology
of sources which were inaccessible to production because of undue burdens and costs of
access. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at C-42 (“[D]atabases that were
designed to create certain information in certain ways and that cannot readily create very
different kinds or forms of information.”).
140
Advisory Committee Report, supra note 2, at C-83. See also Proctor & Gamble Co.
v. Haugen, 427 F. 3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that absent an agreement or a court
order mandating preservation of a dynamic database, a failure to preserve is not
necessarily spoliation).
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[47] While Rule 34(a) provides authority for compelling a recalcitrant
party to either produce the information or to allow direct access to the
database,141 the duty to preserve does not require a party to undertake to
create storage systems or install software.142 For example, in Convolve
Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp.,143 sanctions were unsuccessfully sought
for the failure to act affirmatively to preserve representations of electronic
data portrayed on an oscilloscope each time a new parameter was tested.144
No requirement to do so existed as a matter of business practice and no
steps had been taken to require that it be done.145 The Magistrate Judge
noted that the information portrayed, in contrast to the stored text of an email, was fleeting or “ephemeral” and, unless stored, existed on the screen
only until the next adjustment was made.146
141

See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (COMM. NOTE) (“The addition of testing and sampling to Rule
34(a) with regard to documents and electronically stored information is not meant to
create a routine right of direct access to a party’s electronic information system, although
such access might be justified in some circumstances.”). See also In re: Ford Motor Co.,
345 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (mandamus granted to prevent direct access to
database for abuse of discretion in absence of findings of discovery misconduct by Ford).
142
In Lenker v. Nat’l Serv Indust., No. 2:04-cv-0523, 2006 WL 1995610, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio, July 14, 2006), the court denied a request for direct access to computer software to
run calculations it would have liked to have had because “a party is not required to
provide previously non-existing estimates of such information.” See also Paramount
Pictures Corp. v. Replay TV, CV 01-938 FMC (Ex), 2002 WL 32151632, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. May 30, 2002). The court stated that in order to collect the information, “defendants
would be required to undertake a major software development effort, incur substantial
expense, and spend approximately four months doing so.” Id.
143
See Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
144
Id. at 169. The argument was that the engineer had a duty to “print” out the
information on the screen or to save the information to a disk, despite the fact that this
was not a normal business practice.
145
See Getty Props. Corp. v. Raceway Petroleum, Inc., No. Civ. A. 99-CV-4395DMC,
2005 WL 1412134, at *4 (D. N.J. June 14, 2005) (refusing sanctions for failure to
preserve since “Raceway’s failure to create more reports than it used in the daily
activities of its business is not the kind of willful action that discovery sanctions are
intended to redress.”).
146
Convolve, 223 F.R.D. at 177. Methods available to capture dynamic information often
require an inordinate and extraordinary effort. One option, borrowed from the world of
surveillance utilizes software programs with the capability of recording a series of rapid
“screen shots” of onscreen activity. Affirmative steps can also be taken to locate hidden
or fragmentary traces available through forensic examination. See O’Brien v. O’Brien,
899 So. 2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (estranged wife installed a program on a
home laptop which “took snapshots of what appeared on the computer screen.”).
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[48] One approach to implementing preservation of snapshots of
information on databases is to work out an arrangement, by agreement or
court order, whereby agreed-upon queries of the database are made and
recorded. The results may be saved in imaged format since extracting
only the relevant data from a complex database application in a native
format may not be feasible.147
4. DELETED INFORMATION
[49] It is not unusual for a mirror image of the hard drive of a current or
former employee to be sought early in cases involving alleged theft of
intellectual property or in unfair competition disputes.148 Even after
deletion of files from the hard drives of individual computers, some traces
remain in unallocated space not used for active storage and may be
recovered. However, prompt action is often required since the continued
operation of a computer can alter metadata and embedded data as well as
hamper the ability to recover deleted information. Under the 2006
Amendments, courts will apply the “good cause” analysis of Rule
26(b)(2)(B) before granting such relief.149
[50] Thus, the need to preserve individual hard drives may arise by virtue
of anticipation of an emergency request to do so pursuant to a court order.
Even absent such a potential request, however, if there is reason to suspect
that deleted information on individual hard drives is or may become
147

See Douglas Herman, Digital Investigations - Where You Forgot to Look: Why
Databases Often Are Overlooked When it Comes Time to Harvest Electronic Data,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., (Aug. 2006), available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=January&artY
ear=2007&EntryNo=5440 (last visited March 19, 2007) (“To extract data from a
relational structure such as a CRM or ERP database, requires specific expertise and a
solid understand of the underlying bases of how these databases work.”).
148
See Quotient, Inc. v. Toon, Inc., No. 13-C-05-64087, 2005 WL 4006493 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 23, 2005) (using risk of overwriting data of possible evidentiary value that may exist
in “unallocated clusters” as justification for ordering copying of hard drive because of
“substantial probability” of loss or degradation in accessibility of deleted or undeleted emails, IMs and /or other files).
149
See Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Paul Liberman, et al., No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93380 at *15 (Dec. 27, 2006) (conducting good cause inquiry and
setting conditions for discovery including payment of reasonable costs for three step
procedure ordered).
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material to a dispute, it may be appropriate to forensically preserve the
contents of the hard drives.150 If the proper utility is used and a
forensically sound copy of the hard drive is made – sometimes called a
“bit stream backup” (a sector-by-sector/bit-by-bit copy which preserves
not only the files and directory structures, but also the latent data)151 – it
may be possible to recover deleted information from the unallocated space
at a later point in time.
5. LEGACY DATA
[51] Many parties have sources of “legacy” data152 in both ESI and hard
copy form. ESI often resides on obsolete backup media (from which it
cannot be easily extracted) or on un-indexed magnetic tapes sequestered
pursuant to lapsed litigation holds.153 In some industries, the amount of
legacy information in paper form is also quite significant and often lacks
meaningful indices.
[52] Absent an agreement with opposing parties, preservation decisions
can be quite difficult. As noted earlier, identification of sources not being
searched may have to be made under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) when there is a
reason to believe that there may be discoverable information on that
source.154 The identification must include a description of the source by
150

Some entities make it a routine practice to retain, intact, the hard drives of terminated
employees for similar reasons. Different issues are involved in regard to preservation of
the hard drives of networked servers because mirror images are not likely to be as
successful in that context.
151
Computer forensic specialists use a number of applications, including Encase,
SnapBack, Ghost, etc. See Whitney and Jacobs, supra note 116, at *70. See also
Krumwiede v. Brighton Assoc., L.L.C., No. 05C30003, 2006 WL 1308629 at *4 (N.D.
Ill. May 8, 2006) (“[F]orensically valid copy of the laptop’s hard drive [was created]
using EnCase software.”).
152
For these purposes, legacy data is information which exists in retrievable form but has
not been indexed and is not currently (or recently been) in use.
153
See Linnen v. A. H. Robbins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 16, 1999) (ruling that backup tapes in existence at the time a preservation
obligation attaches are potentially subject to discovery even if the only reason they still
exist is because of a litigation hold in another case).
154
The form of production of any legacy information is to be addressed as part of Rule
26(b)(2)(B) analysis. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (COMM NOTE) (“The question of whether a
producing party should be required to convert [legacy] information to a more usable
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category or type155 so that the requesting party can decide if it wishes to
initiate a challenge to the decision to ignore that source.156
[53] Obviously, a common sense rule of reason applies. Where the
estimated time range and business or functional sources of the information
are remote from any discoverable topics, the legacy information can be
ignored. Targeted sampling may be used to help evaluate the contents of
legacy sources. In the case of backup tapes, a date and user range can be
established for a group of backup tapes and comparisons can then be made
against an inventory of existing litigations holds.157 A good faith effort to
identify and list potentially discoverable sources should yield a
presumptive finding that preservation obligations have been satisfied.
B. OFFENSIVE USE OF PROTECTIVE ORDERS
[54] The Advisory Committee decided, after the Public Hearings, to
provide for immediate and direct access to the court so that “the
responding party [can seek] to determine its search and potential
preservation obligations by moving for a protective order.”158
[55] Carefully framed preservation orders can help dispense with
impractical preservation requirements as well as resolve the accessibility
dilemma created by Rule 26(b)(2)(B). For example, an order can relieve
form, or should be required to produce it at all, should be addressed under Rule
26(b0(20(B).”).
155
To take an example, a party could identify the general nature of the legacy media (e.g.,
“backup tapes from e-mail servers in Division X for unknown years prior to 19XX.”).
156
A regime of focused discovery, which might include sampling, may be needed to learn
more about the burdens and costs involved as well as the value that a full restoration and
search might bring.
157
Specialist “extraction” vendors argue that it has become technically and economically
feasible to open a “window” into backup tapes by concentrating on the tape header, file
listings, custodian and .psts reports. See Electronic Discovery: The Effect of the
Proposed Amendments, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., at 30 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=December&art
Year=2005&EntryNo=3949 (estimating the cost of preparing a catalog at about 20% of
the cost of a full restoration and search).
158
The Advisory Committee added language to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) after the Public
Hearings to clarify that “the responding party may wish to determine its search and
potential preservation obligations by moving for a protective order.” Advisory
Committee Report, supra note 2, at C-50.
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parties of the necessity of preserving backup media or duplicative copies
of e-mail or otherwise resolve contentious but ambiguous preservation
issues.159 Moreover, a preservation order may contain allocation of any
unusual or disproportionate costs involved in the litigation hold process.
In Treppel v. Biovail Corp.,160 the court noted that if it were required to
issue a preservation order over objection, it could be accompanied by cost
-shifting where information of only marginal relevance is ordered to be
preserved.161
C. LITIGATION HOLDS
[56] A key initial decision in applying a litigation hold is whether to make
an immediate preemptive collection or to await further clarification of the
scope of potential discovery. The timing of any particular dispute is often
unanticipated and the legal department may have significant competing
obligations as they seek to retain outside counsel, struggle to fully
understand the claims being made and try to anticipate the preservation
steps that need to be taken. A narrow initial approach to scope is not
without risk,162 however, and any approach should be periodically reexamined as the case proceeds.
[57] A related issue is the need to determine the file format in which
information should be preserved. If data is collected before agreement has
been reached on the form or forms of production, producing parties should
159

See In re St. Jude Medical, Inc., Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL
1396, 2002 WL 341019 (D.C. Minn. Mar. 1, 2002).
160
Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
161
Id. at 372. The Court concluded that while the tardy recognition of a preservation
obligation was “cause for concern,” no showing had been made that the steps being
undertaken at the time of the hearing on the motion, which included creating images of
the hard drives of the individuals involved, were inadequate. See also Kemper Mortgage,
Inc. v. Russell, No. 3:06-cv-042, 2006 WL 2319858, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2006)
(stating that preservation costs cannot be shifted “at least in the absence of a demand for a
litigation hold which seeks court enforcement and/or requests for discovery which can
limit the amount of information which needs to be preserved”).
162
In Consol. Alum. Corp. v. ALCOA, a party initially failed, in the view of the court, to
adequately define the key actors whose e-mail needed to be preserved at the time of an
initial litigation hold. The Court tempered its subsequent award of monetary sanctions
because the party took additional steps, including an expansion of the list of persons
notified, segregations and sequestering of monthly backup tapes and creation of a
“snapshot’ of current email at the time of expansion. Consol. Alum. Corp. v. ALCOA,
No. 03-1055-C-M2, 2006 WL 2583308, at *7 (M.D. La. July 19, 2006).
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consider retaining information subject to a litigation hold in native file
formats so as to preserve the ability to later review and produce any of the
metadata or embedded data. In some situations, it may also be appropriate
to create a “mirror image” of individual hard drives in order to preserve
the option to make a full forensic analysis of the contents at a later time.
[58] Another imperative is to ensure that automatic features that may have
the potential to destroy discoverable information are disabled and that
persons that have the potential to destroy discovery information learn of
their duty not to do so.163 Many entities manage their e-mail storage by
limiting the size of mailboxes or conducting sweeps to eliminate stale
information which has not been used or accessed after a certain period. A
party cannot exploit the routine operation of a system by allowing it to
continue in order to destroy specific stored information of key players that
it is otherwise required to keep.164 The Committee Note to Rule 37(f)
explains that such an approach would violate the duty to exercise good
faith.165.
[59] Some of the other considerations involved in planning and executing
the litigation hold include:
1. Scope of Effort. Identification of the relevant data sources, the
period of time involved and the number of possible custodians is
essential to designing and implementing the litigation hold. Some
commercial or employment matters may involve a finite period of
time at a point in the past. At the other end of the spectrum,
matters involving business practices such as sales and marketing,
pricing, or employment tend to involve vast amounts of
information, large numbers of custodians, very diverse data types,
163

See Miller v. Holzmann, CA No. 95-01231 (RCL/JMF), 2007 WL 172327, at *5 (D.
D.C. Jan. 17, 2007) (referencing the need of counsel to deal with programming of
computers to destroy information after a period of time).
164
See Tantivy Commc’ns, Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., No. Civ.A.2:04CV79, 2005 WL
2860976 at *2 (E.D.Tex. Nov. 1, 2005) (stating that party and counsel permitted loss of
relevant documents and ESI due to system operations without credible explanation).
165
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 37(f) (COMM. NOTE) (“When a party is under a duty to preserve
information because of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation, intervention in the
routine operation of an information system is one aspect of what is often called a
‘litigation hold.’”).
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and often involve both historic and forward-looking operations. In
that context, the preservation and collection plans can be complex,
multi-faceted, and fraught with risk and difficulty.
2. Affected Custodians. There can be a variety of possible
custodians to be notified of the litigation hold. Some have
responsibility and privileges of access as managers of systems or
databases. Others have a more personal or direct involvement as
potential users of PCs or as managers of hard-copy filing systems.
Record coordinators can function as stewards of data stored at their
paper warehouses and may also have responsibility for dispersed
storage of records.
3. Hard-Copy Storage. Preservation obligations apply to all forms
of information, not just ESI. Accordingly, affirmative action
should be taken to suspend destruction of relevant hard copy
information pursuant to storage or records destruction policies or
related internal requirements.
4.

Monitoring of Compliance. Tracking actual compliance with
litigation holds and furnishing reminders is particularly important
where there is a significant time lag between original notification
and the complete collection of data or if multiple or completing
litigation holds are in effect.
The ability to cross-check
information about custodians, systems, and continuing holds is an
essential attribute of any system designed to accomplish
compliance monitoring. Consideration should also be given to
reducing the potential for custodian confusion as to which
preservation obligations remain in place and which have ceased.

5. Change Management. As noted, when the scope of discovery
becomes more established, the nature and scope of the litigation
hold will have to change as well.
6. Coordination with Other Holds. As new holds arise, checks
should be made to determine if the information required is already
preserved through other litigation holds.
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Disclosure to Opposing Counsel. The details of the litigation
hold process should be candidly disclosed to opposing counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION

[60] The identification and resolution of preservation disputes without
resort to post-production sanction practice is crucial to the success of the
2006 E-Discovery Amendments. The enhanced “litigation hold” process
described in this article can help meet that objective. Moreover, a
judicious use of the spirit and intent of the limited “safe harbor” should
help provide guidance for courts and parties facing the need to resolve any
preservation disputes which may remain.
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